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Abstract 
A two-stage procedure is employed to evaluate non-bank financial institution cost efficiency. In 
the first stage, data envelopment analysis is used to calculate technical, allocative and cost 
efficiency indices using a sample of two hundred Australian credit unions. The results indicate that 
a typical credit union’s costs in 1997 were thirty percent above what could be considered efficient 
on the basis of observed best practice. The major source of overall cost inefficiency would appear 
to be allocative inefficiency, rather than technical inefficiency. The second stage uses limited 
dependent variable regression techniques to relate credit union efficiency scores to financial 
statement information. The results indicate that commercial lending activities, expenditures on 
information technology and marketing and promotion, the proportion of non-interest income, and 
association membership are a significant influence on the level of cost efficiency. The results are 
found to be invariant to alternative model specifications where input prices are first assumed to be 
different for each credit union and then assumed to be identical across the sample. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last two decades, sweeping changes to the restrictions governing deposit-taking 
institutions (DTIs) around the globe have been made. DTIs who previously operated within well-
defined, institution-specific, regulatory sub-sectors have been forced to adapt to newly deregulated 
environments. A similar experience has occurred in Australia where regional and major joint-stock 
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banks now compete on a largely equal regulatory footing with predominantly mutual credit unions 
and building societies. While the large commercial banks could be expected to be well placed for 
the newly-deregulated product markets, the fact that the overwhelmingly smaller credit unions have 
survived and competed in what is a highly competitive environment is most interesting. Moreover, 
given that certain credit union institutional characteristics are argued to constrain cost-effective 
behaviour, their ability to survive competition from non-member owned financial institutions 
presents an even more compelling area of inquiry.    
Australian credit unions differ from non-member owned financial institutions in at least four 
respects. First, credit unions operate on a cooperative basis, principally by borrowing from and 
lending to their members. In principle, new members join on equal terms to existing members and 
the key principle of mutuality is maintained, implying ‘one member, one vote’. One aspect of this 
process is that an individual member can acquire only one vote regardless of the value of funds 
committed, and that credit unions cannot acquire shares in another. Hostile acquisition is therefore 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Second, profits earned by the credit unions are not ordinarily 
distributed to members; rather they are accumulated and held perpetually in the form of reserves for 
the benefit of current and future members. The owner-members cannot sell their claims to any 
accumulated surplus on a secondary market and no claim can be made on this surplus if 
membership lapses.  
Third, in spite of the erosion of some traditional objectives of credit unions, there is still an 
emphasis on the common associational bond or affinity that defines membership. For example, 
credit unions in Australia are restricted to three categories: namely, industrial (employee) groups; 
community-based (geographic) groups; and parish (religious) groups. This implies that credit 
unions are restricted (in principle) in many product markets. Finally, there is the suggestion that 
structural change in cooperative financial services is essentially restricted to ‘friendly’ mergers, and 
that there is a large degree of acquiescence by regulatory authorities in this matter. Furthermore, it 
is also the case that liquidation of Australian credit unions has been extremely rare, and it is widely 
understood that the exit of a credit union in financial distress is likely to occur through merger 
rather than liquidation (Brown et al., 1999). 
Taken together, these characteristics generally imply that credit unions, in Australia and 
elsewhere, “…suffer from a particularly acute agency problem” (Thompson, 1997, p. 40). It is 
argued that the owner-members have no particular incentive to participate in decision-making or 
monitoring performance, and that regulatory intervention in the form of forced mergers effectively 
renders deposits risk-free. The democratic principle underlying voting procedures in credit unions 
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further implies that it would be extremely difficult to build a voting coalition against incumbent 
management. When combined, the weak ownership claims and the absence of a secondary equity 
market appears to favour managerial control over depositor ownership. This has led Thompson 
(1997, p. 40), amongst others, “to conclude that the managers of financial mutuals engage in 
systematic expense preference-behaviour and/or departures from cost minimisation”.   
Unfortunately, little empirical evidence exists concerning departures from cost minimisation in 
Australian credit unions. A thorough examination of cost efficiency will throw light on both 
possible pressures for consolidation (either regulatory enforced or otherwise) and the ability of 
credit unions to effectively compete in product markets dominated by the major banks. Likewise, 
the presence of scale economies in financial services has been sufficiently well established, both in 
Australia and overseas [see, for instance, Drake and Weyman-Jones (1992), Esho and Sharpe 
(1994), Fukuyama (1996) and Worthington (1999)] and the concomitant cost advantages larger 
banks have over smaller competitors quantified. However, for various reasons credit unions may be 
unable to achieve an optimal scale of operations. For example, regulatory restrictions on 
membership to a specific associational bond (that is, either industrial, community-based or parish) 
may restrict credit unions to a sub-optimal size. Furthermore, “cost reduction strategies which seek 
economies of scale … may have the effect of distancing a credit union from the members it needs to 
know well” (Brown et al., 1999, p. 18). These concerns highlight the need for measures of cost 
efficiency that are not confounded by the impact of scale economies. 
With these considerations in mind, an attempt is made to examine the cost efficiency of 
Australian credit unions. The purposes of this exercise are twofold. First, we calculate measures of 
cost efficiency using nonparametric methods. Second, we explain the calculated efficiency scores in 
terms of the operating characteristics of individual credit unions. This provides insights into the 
determinants of inefficiencies, and yields useful information about the possible impact of recent 
deregulation and future pressures for consolidation. The paper itself is divided into five main areas. 
Section 2 briefly surveys the frontier approach to efficiency measurement in financial services. 
Section 3 explains the nonparametric technique used in the measurement of credit union cost 
efficiency. Section 4 deals with the specification of inputs and outputs in this model. The results are 
dealt with in Section 5. The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks. 
2. Frontier approaches to efficiency measurement 
The recent history of microeconomic efficiency measurement begins with Farrell (1957) who 
defined a simple measure of firm efficiency that could account for multiple inputs. In his approach, 
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Farrell (1957) proposed that the efficiency of any given firm consisted of two components: 
technical efficiency, or the ability of a firm to maximise output from a given set of inputs, and 
allocative efficiency, or the ability of a firm to use these inputs in optimal proportions, given the 
respective prices. Combining the two measures provides a measure of cost or productive efficiency. 
It is Farrell’s (1957) suggestion that efficiency could be measured empirically in reference to an 
idealised frontier isoquant – or equivalently, disturbances in an econometric model – which forms 
the basis of subsequent analysis.  
Fig. 1. Technical, allocative and cost efficiencies 
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The essence of Farrell’s (1957) argument is contained in Figure 1. Here two inputs, x1 and x2, are 
utilised to produce a single output, y, under an assumption of constant returns to scale. The isoquant 
of the fully efficient firm SS' (showing the alternative combinations of inputs which can used to 
produce a given level of output) permits the measurement of technical efficiency. For a given firm 
using quantities of inputs defined by point P to produce a unit of output, the level of technical 
efficiency may be defined as the ratio OQ/OP. This is the proportional reduction in all inputs (ie. by 
movement onto the efficient isoquant) that could be theoretically achieved without any reduction in 
output. The technical efficiency ratio for the firm at point P will then be less than unity. Point Q, on 
the other hand, is technically efficient since it already lies on the efficient isoquant. The technical 
efficiency ratio of the firm at Q is OQ/OQ or unity, thereby implying absolute or relative efficiency 
(depending upon the manner in which the efficient isoquant is constructed). If the input price ratio 
AA' is known (showing the different combinations of inputs that can be purchased with a given cost 
outlay), then allocative efficiency at point P is the ratio OR/OQ, where the distance RQ is the 
reduction in production costs which would occur if production occurred at Q' – the allocatively and 
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technically efficient point, rather than Q – the technically efficient, but allocatively inefficient 
point. Hence, total economic (cost) efficiency is the ratio OR/OP, with the cost reduction 
achievable being the distance RP. Note that the cost efficiency ratio OR/OP is the product of the 
technical efficiency ratio OQ/OP and the allocative efficiency ratio OR/OQ. 
Of course, these efficiency measures assume the production function of the fully efficient firm is 
known. As this is usually not the case, the efficient isoquant must be estimated using sample data. 
Farrell (1957) suggested the use of either: (i) a nonparametric piecewise-linear convex isoquant 
constructed such that no observed point should lie to the left or below it (known as the 
mathematical programming approach to the construction of frontiers); or (ii) a parametric function, 
such as the Cobb-Douglas form, fitted to the data, again such that no observed point should lie to 
the left or below it (known as the econometric approach). These approaches use different 
techniques to envelop the observed data, and therefore make different accommodations for random 
noise and for flexibility in the structure of the production technology.  
First, the econometric approach specifies a production function and normally recognises that 
deviation away from this given technology (as measured by the error term) is composed of two 
parts, one representing randomness (or statistical noise) and the other inefficiency. The usual 
assumption with the two-component error structure is that the inefficiencies follow an asymmetric 
half-normal distribution and the random errors are normally distributed. The random error term is 
generally thought to encompass all events outside the control of the organisation, including both 
uncontrollable factors directly concerned with the ‘actual’ production function (such as differences 
in operating environments) and econometric errors (such as misspecification of the production 
function and measurement error). This type of reasoning has primarily led to the development of the 
‘stochastic frontier approach’ (SFA) which seeks to take these external factors into account when 
estimating the efficiency of real-world organisations, and the ‘deterministic frontier approach’ 
(DFA) which assumes that all deviations from the estimated frontier represent inefficiency. A 
number of previous studies have used this approach to estimate the efficiency of non-bank financial 
institutions. These include Cebenoyan et al. (1993), McKillop and Glass (1994), Drake and 
Weyman-Jones (1996), Esho and Sharpe (1996) and Worthington (1998a; 1998b). 
Second, and in contrast to the econometric approaches which attempt to determine the absolute 
economic efficiency of organisations against some imposed benchmark, the mathematical 
programming approach seeks to evaluate the efficiency of an organisation relative to other 
organisations in the same industry. The most commonly employed version of this approach is a 
linear programming tool referred to as ‘data envelopment analysis’ (DEA). DEA essentially 
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calculates the economic efficiency of a given organisation relative to the performance of other 
organisations producing the same good or service, rather than against an idealised standard of 
performance. A less-constrained alternative to DEA sometimes employed in the analysis of 
efficiency in financial services is known as ‘free-disposal hull’ (FDH). Both DEA and FDH are 
nonstochastic methods in that they assume all deviations from the frontier are the result of 
inefficiency. These approaches have been applied to non-bank financial institutions by Fried, Lovell 
and Vanden Eeckaut (1993), Piesse and Townsend (1995), Drake and Weyman-Jones (1996), Fried, 
Lovell and Turner (1996), and Worthington (1999). Suitably detailed surveys of both the 
mathematical programming and econometric approaches to efficiency measurement may be found 
in Førsund, Lovell and Schmidt (1980), Seiford and Thrall (1990), Greene (1993), Lovell (1993), 
Ali and Seiford (1993) and Charnes, Cooper, Lewin and Seiford (1993)]. 
The approach employed in the current paper to empirically construct measures of cost, allocative 
and technical efficiency is based upon the DEA approach. One obvious problem with DEA is that in 
contrast to the econometric approaches to efficiency measurement it is both nonparametric and 
nonstochastic. Thus, no accommodation is made for the types of bias resulting from environmental 
heterogeneity, external shocks, measurement error, and omitted variables. Consequently, the entire 
deviation from the frontier is assessed as being the result of inefficiency. This may lead to either an 
under or over-statement of the level of inefficiency.  
However, there a number of benefits implicit in the mathematical programming approach that 
makes it attractive on a theoretical level. First, given its nonparametric basis it is relatively easy to 
alter the specification of inputs and outputs and thereby the formulation of the production 
correspondence relating inputs to outputs. Thus, in cases where the usual axioms of production 
activity breakdown (ie. profit maximisation) then the programming approach may offer useful 
insights into the efficiency of these types of industries. This is especially the case with mutual 
financial institutions. Second, when using either econometric approach considerable structure is 
imposed upon the data from stringent parametric form and distributional assumptions regarding 
both inefficiency and, in the case of SFA, statistical noise. These considerations, and the natural 
emphasis of DEA on the notion of ‘best-practice’ performance, make it an attractive choice from 
these two separate, though conceptually similar, approaches to the assessment of cost efficiency 
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3. Empirical Methodology 
The computational procedure used to implement the DEA approach to cost efficiency 
measurement consists of two steps. The first step is to obtain measures of technical efficiency as 
introduced by Charnes et al. (1978). Consider N credit unions each producing M different outputs 
using K different inputs. The K×N input matrix, X, and the M×N output matrix, Y, represent the data 
of all N credit unions, while for the individual credit union these are represented by the vectors xi 
and yi.  
The purpose of DEA is to construct a non-parametric envelopment frontier over the data points 
such that all observed points lie on or below the production frontier. The relative efficiency of each 
credit union in ratio form (where for each credit union we obtain a ratio of all outputs over all 
inputs) is specified as follows: 
max ( )
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where yi is the vector of outputs produced by the ith credit union, xi is the vector of inputs used by 
the ith credit union, u is a M×1 vector of output weights and v is a K×1 vector of input weights (the 
prime denotes a transposed vector), i runs from 1 to N, and j equals 1, 2, ..., N. The first inequality 
ensures that the efficiency ratios for all credit unions cannot exceed one, whilst the second ensures 
that the weights are non-negative. The weights are determined such that each credit union 
maximises its own efficiency ratio. A problem with this particular ratio formulation is that it has an 
infinite number of solutions. To avoid this the constraint v′xi = 1 is imposed. This fractional linear 
program (1) can then be transformed into the following equivalent linear programming problem: 
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where the notation change from u and v to μ and ν reflects the transformation. Using the duality of 
linear programming, this multiplier form can then be used to derive an equivalent envelopment 
form of the problem: 
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where θ is a scalar and λ is a N×1 vector of constants. The value of θ will be the technical 
efficiency score for a particular credit union. It will satisfy θ ≤ 1, with a value of 1 indicating a 
point on the frontier, and hence a technically efficient credit union. The value of θ ≤ 1 identifies the 
amount of any inefficiencies that may be present.  
The model specified in (3) has an assumption of constant returns-to-scale (CRS) and is only 
appropriate where all credit unions are operating at an optimal scale. Where this assumption does 
not hold, scale effects will confound the measures of technical efficiency. Generally, regulatory, 
geographical and institutional constraints imply that most credit unions are not operating at an optimal 
scale. Following Banker et al. (1984) the linear programming problem can be modified to account for 
variable returns-to-scale (VRS) (that is, measures of technical efficiency without scale efficiency 
effects) by adding the convexity constraint N1′λ = 1 to (3).  
The second step is to calculate cost efficiency with respect to this DEA dual reference 
technology by solving the following linear program (including the convexity constraint): 
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where wi is a vector of input prices for the ith credit union and xi* is the cost-minimising vector of 
input quantities for the ith credit union given the input price vector wi and the output vector yi. The 
ratio (wi′xi*/wi′xi) measures the cost (or economic or productive) efficiency (CE) of the ith credit 
union, and [(wi′xi*/wi′xi)-1-1] measures the amount by which cost is increased due to both kinds of 
inefficiency (both technical and allocative): that is, the ratio of minimum to observed cost. 
Following the earlier discussion, allocative efficiency (AE) can then be calculated residually by 
dividing cost efficiency (CE) by technical efficiency (TE).  
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The primary technique used for explaining variation in the various efficiency measures is a 
regression-based approach. In this model, the calculated measures of technical efficiency (TE), 
allocative efficiency (AE) and cost efficiency (CE) for all credit unions (both efficient and 
inefficient) are specified as the dependent variable in three separate regressions. Given that in each 
case the calculated measure of efficiency is a limited dependent variable, tobit estimation is 
appropriate. The explanatory variables posited to explain the presence of inefficiency are a set of 
institutional characteristics and financial measures that characterise each credit union’s operations. 
Aly, Grabowski, Pasurka and Rangan (1990), Drake and Weyman-Jones (1992), Fried, Lovell and 
Vanden Eeckaut (1993) and Worthington (1999), amongst others, have also used nonparametric 
techniques to measure efficiency in financial institutions, followed by parametric techniques to 
explain variation in efficiency. 
4. Specification of variables 
Summary statistics of the inputs, input prices and outputs used in the calculation of the 
nonparametric efficiency measures are detailed in Table 1. All data corresponds to the financial 
year ending 30 June 1997 and is obtained from the Australian Financial Institutions Commission 
(AFIC). The variables apply to a sample of the two hundred largest credit unions (by book value of 
assets).  
The actual specification of these variables is contingent upon one’s a priori conceptualisation of 
financial institution behaviour, for which two primary approaches exist. The first of these, the 
production approach, conceptualises financial institutions, such as credit unions, as producers of 
loan and deposit accounts. In this instance, outputs are defined as the number of such accounts, or 
their associated transactions, while capital and labour expenses and total operating costs define the 
firm’s inputs and total costs respectively.  
The second approach to financial institution behaviour is termed the intermediation approach. 
Here financial institutions are viewed as “...intermediators of financial services rather than 
producers of loan and deposit account services, and the values of loans and investments are used as 
output measures; labour and capital are inputs to this process, hence operating costs plus interest 
costs are the relevant cost measure. Deposits may be either inputs or outputs” (Colwell and Davis, 
1992, p. 113). In most instances, the intermediation approach is the preferred conceptualisation 
(Colwell and Davis, 1992, p. 113). Furthermore, the intermediation approach is consistent with both 
existing commercial bank studies, and specific thrift analyses such as Fried et al. (1993). Brief 
reviews of these conceptualisations, along with several others, may be found in Colwell and Davis 
  
10 
(1992) and Favero and Papi (1995). Empirical studies concerned with the effects of alternative 
specifications of inputs and outputs in financial institutions include Piesse and Townsend (1995) 
and Worthington (1998c). 
The inputs and input prices used in the calculation of the efficiency measures are presented in 
Table 1. The three inputs selected are (i) labour (LAB) (measured in full-time equivalent units), (ii) 
physical capital (CAP)  (book value of premises and fixed assets), and (iii) loanable funds (time and 
savings deposits plus other borrowed funds) (FND). The price of labour (WGE) is derived by 
dividing total expenditures on employees (salaries, wages and on-costs) by the number of full-time 
equivalent units of labour. Of course, there are obvious problems associated with measuring labour 
inputs and labour input prices in this way. A preferred approach would be to use total hours 
worked, disaggregated across different types of labour to capture differences in the quality of 
labour, say, between administrative and operational staff. Unfortunately, information of this type is 
not readily available.  
The price of capital (RTE) is proxied by dividing physical capital expenses (office and 
equipment expenses plus depreciation) by the book value of net office premises and equipment 
(including office buildings and land, leasehold improvements, furniture and fixtures, capitalised 
leases). This measure is generally regarded as current payment for the use of physical capital, 
primarily office buildings, vehicles and office equipment. Specification of the cost of physical 
capital in this manner is common in the financial services efficiency literature [see, for instance, 
Aly et al. (1990), Grabowski et al. (1993), Elyasiani et al. (1994), Drake and Weyman-Jones (1996) 
and Worthington (1998a; 1998b]. Finally, the price of loanable funds (INT) is the sum of interest 
expenses divided by total loanable funds and recognises the direct costs associated with deposits as 
a source of funds. This measure follows the work of Mester (1987; 1993), Aly, Grabowski, Pasurka 
and Rangan (1990), McKillop and Glass (1994) and Fried, Lovell and Turner (1996). 
Notwithstanding the widespread use of these proxies for the price of labour, physical capital and 
loanable funds, there is the suggestion that such measures do not reflect the fact that credit unions 
purchase their inputs in competitive markets and face no such cost differences. For example, in a 
study of Australian building societies, Esho and Sharpe (1994, p. 264) use weekly earnings in the 
finance industry to proxy the price of labour on the basis that “Australia’s centralised industrial 
relations system effectively ensures very little wage variation across firms employing the same type 
of labour”. Furthermore, some variation in input prices may merely represent a difference in the 
combination of inputs employed by different credit unions. For instance, by using office and 
equipment expenses to calculate the price of capital, different methods of delivering services (such 
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as branch networks versus phone banking) may manifest themselves as mismeasured differences in 
the price of capital across firms. This problem is also likely to extend to the pricing of loanable 
funds. For example, by using interest expense to calculate the cost of funds, at least some variation 
is likely to represent differences in depositor services as bundled into a package of interest income 
plus services, rather than any real difference in the cost of funds across credit unions. 
Table 1 
Variables and selected descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
deviation 
Outputs   
PER Book value of personal loans and consumer credit facilities ($000s) 28307.00 39466.00
RES Book value of property and real estate loans ($000s) 35212.00 60107.00
COM Book value of commercial loans ($000s) 2009.20 4287.60
DEP Deposits with other deposit-taking institutions ($000s) 1208.90 2789.90
SEC Book value of financial securities ($000s) 13994.00 19873.00
Inputs   
LAB Labour (number of full-time equivalent staff) 39.65 51.26
CAP Physical capital (book value of premises and fixed assets) ($000s) 1730.20 3325.80
FND Loanable funds (time and savings deposits) ($000s) 73862.00 104010.00
Input prices   
WGE Price of labour (salary expenses per employee) ($000s) 39.01 10.17
RTE Price of physical capital (ratio of physical capital expenses to book 
value of office premises and equipment) 
0.0393 0.0652
INT Price of loanable funds (ratio of total interest expenses to loanable 
funds) 
0.0449 0.0118
Explanatory variables 
CAP/TA Ratio of member capital to total assets 0.1005 0.0356
TA/TL Ratio of total assets to total liabilities 1.1136 0.0478
NI/TR Proportion of non-interest income in total revenue 0.0799 0.0551
NPAT/TA Ratio of net profit after-tax to total assets 0.0066 0.0055
INF/TE Information technology expense to total expense ratio 0.0479 0.0246
MKT/TE Marketing expense to total expense ratio 0.0208 0.0120
RES/LOAN Proportion of real estate and property loans in loan portfolio 0.4832 0.1771
COM/LOAN Proportion of commercial loans in loan portfolio 0.0348 0.0436
BAD/LOAN Ratio of bad and doubtful debts expenses to total loans 0.0026 0.0031
MEM Number of members 16784 21357
BRA Number of branches (excluding head office) 4.56 6.58
In order to address these questions, the model and empirical work is repeated under the 
assumption that all credit unions have the same input prices for labour, physical capital and the cost 
of funds. The average gross weekly earnings of all persons employed in the finance and insurance 
industry (Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue No. 6302.0) specifies the wage rate (Esho and 
Sharpe, 1994). The user cost of physical capital is estimated as the long-term interest rate 
(measured by the yield on ten-year Treasury bonds), plus the annual depreciation rate in private 
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business, less the expected annual rate of capital gain on physical assets (measured using the price 
indices for business investment). This data is obtained from the Treasury Model of the Australian 
Economy (Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue No. 1364.0). Hardwick (1997) has used an 
identical measure of the user cost of capital in a study of non-bank financial institutions. Finally, the 
Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin provides the average retail deposit rate on transaction and 
investment accounts as a measure of the cost of loanable funds. The input prices obtained in this 
part of the analysis are $38,200 for labour, 7.10 percent for physical capital and 1.05 percent for 
loanable funds. For the purposes of comparison, average input prices as derived from each credit 
union’s financial statements are detailed in Table 1. 
The five outputs used in the present study follow the thrift analyses of Hardwick (1990), 
Cebenoyan et al. (1993), Drake and Weyman-Jones (1992; 1996), Piesse and Townsend (1995) and 
Worthington (1998a; 1998b; 1999). They are: personal loans and consumer credit facilities (PER); 
property loans and real estate loans (RES); commercial loans (COM); deposits with other thrift 
institutions and banks (DEP); and finally, other securities (SEC) (including bank bills, negotiable 
certificates of deposit, Commonwealth/State/Local and semi-Government securities). Thus, given 
the nonparametric model outlined earlier, credit unions are characterised as producing five 
categories of output, using three inputs with associated factor prices. 
The second part of the two-stage procedure used to measure and explain technical, allocative and 
cost efficiency in Australian credit unions involves the specification of a vector of explanatory 
variables presumed to account for inefficiency. These are intended to evaluate several associated 
hypotheses on the relationships between financial institution inefficiency and firm-specific 
variables. The index measures of efficiency specified as the dependent variables have a lower 
bound of zero and an upper bound of unity. A credit union with an efficiency score less than one is 
relatively ‘inefficient’ to various degrees. For example, a credit union with a cost efficiency score 
of 0.50 is half as cost efficient as the ‘efficient’ credit unions that define the best-practice frontier, 
while one with an efficiency score of 0.90 is only ten percent less cost efficient. A positive 
estimated coefficient in the regression model is thereby associated with an improvement in 
efficiency, while a negative coefficient is linked with a reduction in efficiency. Summary statistics 
for these variables are detailed in Table 1. 
The first group of explanatory variables relates to firm-specific operational characteristics. The 
first explanatory variable is the credit union’s member capital to asset ratio (CAP/TA). All other 
things being equal, “moral hazard theory suggests [the capital asset ratio] should be inversely 
related to inefficiency” (Mester, 1993, p. 282).  The next three variables relate to additional aspects 
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of credit union financial management. These are: (i) the ratio of total assets to total liabilities 
(TA/TL), (ii) the proportion of non-interest income to total revenue (NI/TR) and (iii) the ratio of net 
profit after-tax to total assets (NPAT/TA). The measure of non-interest income as a proportion of 
interest plus non-interest income is considered especially important given that one focus of 
deregulation was that “...the pricing of banking services ... reflect more closely the user pays 
principle, thus creating incentives for allocative efficiency improvements” (Financial System 
Inquiry, 1997, p. 610). However, given the fact that their underlying commitments may not be 
related to specific balance sheet magnitudes, it is somewhat difficult to postulate the relationship 
between non-interest revenue sources and firm efficiency. Regardless, in all three cases, a positive 
coefficient is hypothesised. 
The next group of variables is intended to measure whether efforts by credit unions to improve 
the level of competitiveness and dynamic efficiency post-deregulation are reflected in relatively 
higher levels of technical, allocative and overall cost efficiency. These are the proportions of total 
expenses derived from expenditures on information technology (INF/TE) and total expenses 
associated with expenditures on marketing and promotion (MKT/TE). All other things being equal, 
it is hypothesised that credit unions that have invested heavily in information technology and 
product development should be relatively more efficient in the production of the dollar outputs of 
loans and other financial assets: positive coefficients are hypothesised on both counts. 
The next three variables used to explain credit union efficiency relate to the composition and 
performance of the loan portfolio: (i) the proportion of residential and property loans in the total 
portfolio (RES/LOANS); (ii) the proportion of commercial and business loans in the total loan 
portfolio (COM/LOANS) and (iii) the percentage of total current expenses expensed on bad and 
doubtful debts (BAD/LOANS). One argument here is that a clear ‘market-orientation’ in regards to 
commercial and residential loans may be associated with a relatively more efficient credit union 
(Mester, 1993). In addition, we could also expect that credit unions which are exposed to the strong 
post-deregulation competitive forces in residential and commercial loan markets are obliged to 
undertake programs aimed at enhancing efficiency; at the same time as minimising the side-effects 
of delinquent loans. The ex ante signs on the coefficients for commercial and residential loans are 
thought to be positive, while that for bad and doubtful debts should be negative. 
The final group of variables relates to additional non-financial characteristics of Australian credit 
unions. The first variable is intended to account for the effect of the number of credit union 
members (MEM) on efficiency. All other things being equal, a large credit union in terms of 
number of members will have a more diversified membership than one with a smaller membership. 
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Generally, this would imply that the prospects for attaining efficiency are higher (Fried et al., 
1993). Similarly, credit unions with a large number of members are more likely to actively engage 
in the technological innovation associated with deregulation. Both hypotheses suggest a positive 
coefficient for credit union membership when used as an explanatory variable for technical, 
allocative and cost efficiency. 
The second variable relates to the branching behaviour of credit unions, generating three 
somewhat conflicting hypotheses (Fried et al., 1993). The first is that under the intermediation 
approach, the number of branches and agencies (BRA) are recognised as “...central to the 
intermediation process for most [non-bank financial institutions], it may also be the case that 
differences in the intensity of branching may be an important factor” (Drake and Weyman-Jones, 
1992, p. 5). Accordingly, the number of branches are closely related to the level of financial 
intermediation provided; a negative coefficient is inferred. The second hypothesis is that the 
number of branches and agencies are a critical, and possibly negative factor, in the ability of head 
offices to promote cost efficient behaviour. In this case, we would expect ceteris paribus a positive 
coefficient. The third hypothesis is that branch services are an output offered jointly with deposit 
services; a positive coefficient is also thus postulated.  
5. Results 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the DEA measures of Australian credit union technical, 
allocative and cost efficiency. The inputs used are the number of full-time equivalent staff, physical 
capital and loanable funds, whilst the outputs are the dollar value of personal loans and consumer 
credit facilities, property loans and real estate loans, commercial loans, deposits with other thrift 
institutions and banks, and other financial securities. The factor prices used are the implied prices of 
labour, physical capital and the interest rate paid on loanable funds. The measure of overall cost 
inefficiency provided therefore incorporates both allocative inefficiencies which result from failing 
to react optimally to relative prices of inputs and technical inefficiencies from employing too much 
of the inputs to produce the outputs. 
The first set of descriptive statistics in Table 2 are those obtained when input prices are allowed 
to vary across the sample. As indicated, of the 200 credit unions examined, 67 credit unions (or 33 
percent) are judged technically efficient (that is, with an efficiency index equal to one), while 29 
credit unions (some 15 percent) are allocatively efficient. The results for technical efficiency 
indicate that, on average, inputs could be reduced to 94.92 percent of the current level based upon 
observable best-practice, whilst the results for allocative efficiency suggest that efficiency losses 
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due to allocative effects account for 27.14 percent of inputs (that is, 1.0000 – 0.7286). In general, 
more credit unions are either technically efficient or nearly so, with 75 percent of institutions 
having an efficiency score greater than 90.9090 percent. On the other hand, 50 percent of credit 
unions are less than 68.890 percent allocatively efficient when compared to best-practice.  
The results generally indicate that the larger portion of cost efficiency is the result of allocative, 
rather than technical, effects. Examination of the cost-minimising input quantities suggests that if 
the average credit union reduced inputs to the extent of moving onto the efficient frontier, labour 
inputs would be reduced by 7.42 full-time equivalent staff (a cost saving of $289,400) while 
physical capital inputs could achieve a cost saving of $108,460. In terms of international 
comparisons, Fukuyama (1996) measured technical efficiencies of 83 percent in Japanese credit 
associations, Lang and Welzel (1996) estimated cost efficiencies up to 87 percent in a sample of 
German cooperative banks, and Fried et al. (1993) calculated technical efficiencies of 91 percent in 
US credit unions.  
The distribution of technical, allocative and cost efficiency across credit unions using a number 
of nonparametric tests is also examined. It should be emphasised that the sample of 200 councils 
used in this analysis comprises the largest (by total assets) 72 percent of all Australian credit 
unions, and therefore excludes many smaller institutions. Using the Kruskal-Wallis (one way 
analysis of variance) test, an additional effort was made to determine whether the technical, 
allocative and cost efficiencies differed statistically across credit unions. All credit unions were 
divided into quartiles defined on the basis of three variables. The variables by which the credit 
unions were categorised were net profit after-tax, loan portfolio size, and the book value of total 
assets. For example, the first group of credit unions grouped on the basis of the book value of total 
assets consisted of the largest twenty-five percent of credit unions by asset size, the second group 
were the next largest twenty-five percent, and so on.  
This exercise was repeated for all three grouping variables. The test for technical efficiency 
differences using the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic [KW = 12.333, 15.905 and 25.022 ∼ χ2(3) 
respectively] rejects the null hypothesis of equal means across all three variables at the .01 level. 
Put differently, when credit unions are divided into quartiles using the level of net profit after-tax, 
the size of the loan portfolio and total asset size, there are statistically significant differences in 
technical efficiency. Similar results are obtained for Kruskal-Wallis tests with the null hypothesises 
of equal means for allocative efficiency at the .10 level (grouped by total assets) [KW = 6.813 ∼ 
χ2(3)] and cost efficiency grouped by net profit after-tax and total assets at the .10 and .01 level 
respectively [KW = 6.492 and 11.685 ∼ χ2(3)]. This would suggest there are statistically significant 
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differences in the efficiency of credit unions when ranked on the basis of size (by both the size of 
the loan portfolio and the book value of total assets) and profitability.  
In order to further investigate this possibility, these same groups of credit unions are compared 
on the basis of Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov nonparametric test statistics. The null 
hypothesis in the first instance is that the indices are equivalent in location, while in the second the 
null hypothesis is that the groups are equivalent in the shape and location of the efficiency 
distribution. On this basis, it was found that the upper quartile of credit unions based on net profit 
after-tax have a significantly different distribution of technical, allocative and cost efficiency 
compared to the lowest, next to lowest and next to highest quartiles.  
Identical tests of credit unions grouped by the size of the loan portfolio and total assets suggest 
that differences in the distribution of efficiency are more pronounced between the upper 25 percent 
and the lowest 50 percent of credit unions, than between the highest and the next to highest 
quartiles. In addition, most of these differences are on the basis of technical efficiency, rather than 
either allocative or cost efficiency. The main finding is that most of the differences in overall cost 
efficiency across groups of credit unions arise from differences in the distribution of technical 
efficiency rather than allocative efficiency.  
Table 2 
Credit union efficiency indices 
 Technical efficiency Allocative efficiency Cost efficiency 
 All credit 
unions 
Inefficient 
credit unions
All credit 
unions 
Inefficient 
credit unions
All credit 
unions 
Inefficient 
credit unions
With different input prices 
Number 200 133 200 171 200 171 
Mean 0.9492 0.9236 0.7286 0.6825 0.6966 0.6451 
Standard deviation 0.0532 0.0480 0.1662 0.1328 0.1839 0.1456 
First quartile 0.9090 0.8940 0.5935 0.5775 0.5565 0.5380 
Second quartile  0.9600 0.9310 0.6890 0.6650 0.6535 0.6200 
Third quartile 1.0000 0.9600 0.8570 0.7755 0.8435 0.7445 
Fourth quartile 1.0000 0.9980 1.0000 0.9870 1.0000 0.9870 
With identical input prices 
Number 200 133 200 182 200 182 
Mean 0.9492 0.9236 0.6643 0.6311 0.6354 0.5994 
Standard deviation 0.0532 0.0480 0.1781 0.1502 0.1917 0.1608 
First quartile 0.9090 0.8940 0.5280 0.5245 0.4925 0.4848 
Second quartile  0.9600 0.9310 0.6325 0.6155 0.5905 0.5765 
Third quartile 1.0000 0.9600 0.7658 0.7323 0.7598 0.7183 
Fourth quartile 1.0000 0.9980 1.0000 0.9800 1.0000 0.9800 
The second set of descriptive statistics detailed in Table 2 are those where the sample of credit 
unions are assumed to face identical input prices. As the change in specification of the labour, 
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physical capital and loanable funds input prices has no influence on the specification of inputs and 
outputs, the descriptive statistics for technical efficiency are unchanged from those discussed above. 
However, there are some differences between the allocative efficiency indices assuming identical 
input prices and those where input prices are allowed to vary, and accordingly between the 
measures of overall cost efficiency in each case. For example, the mean level of allocative 
efficiency assuming identical prices is 0.6643 and 182 credit unions are calculated to be inefficient, 
whereas the mean level of allocative efficiency assuming different input prices was 72.86 percent 
and 171 credit unions were inefficient. Similarly, the mean level of cost efficiency is 63.54 percent 
assuming identical input prices, and 69.66 percent when input prices are allowed to vary. The 
suggestion is that the mean level of allocative efficiency (and hence, cost efficiency) is generally 
lower when identical input prices are imposed. However, because of the differences in prices the 
cost-minimising input quantities for the average credit union differ from those found earlier. 
Moving onto the efficient frontier when identical input prices are assumed in this instance would 
entail a reduction of labour inputs by 5.89 full-time equivalent staff (a cost saving of $224,900) 
while physical capital inputs could achieve a cost saving of $67,180. 
In order to further investigate how these differences in assumptions may influence efficiency 
indices, a number of nonparametric tests are calculated. First, the Spearman’s (rank) correlations 
between both sets of indices (with and without the assumption of identical prices) are calculated. 
The correlation coefficient for allocative efficiency is 0.847 and that for cost efficiency is 0.873. 
Both correlation coefficients are significant at the .01 level, thereby rejecting the null hypothesis of 
no positive rank correlation. A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test is then calculated for both sets of 
allocative and cost efficiency indices. Test statistics of -8.731 for allocative efficiency and –8.708 
(both significant at the .01 level) confirm that median level of efficiency is lower when identical 
input prices are assumed. Overall, the results indicate that while there are high positive rank 
correlations between allocative and cost efficiency indices under the competing assumptions of 
identical and different input prices, the median level of efficiency is generally lower (at least in the 
current sample) when identical input prices are used.    
The second stage of the estimation procedure involves regressing the calculated efficiency 
indexes (technical, allocative and cost) on a vector of explanatory variables. Results for the tobit 
regressions are summarised in Table 3. The dependent variables for the first three regressions in 
Table 3 are the DEA measures of technical, allocative and cost efficiency indices assuming 
different input prices. The second set of regressions (allocative and cost efficiency only) is where 
identical input prices are imposed in the DEA model. The first three columns are the normalised 
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coefficients, standard errors and elasticities (at the means) of the regression of technical efficiency 
scores on the vector of financial and institutional characteristics presumed to account for efficiency 
differences. The tobit regression shows that technical efficiency varies significantly with a large 
number of included explanatory variables. A test of the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients 
are zero is rejected at the 0.01 percent level using the likelihood ratio procedure.  
Table 3  
Tobit regression results 
 Technical efficiency Allocative efficiency Cost efficiency 
 Normalised 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Elasticity Normalised 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Elasticity Normalised 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Elasticity
With different input prices 
CONS. -56.7620 58.5880 -3.1872 17.9220 6.2051 17.9400
CAP/TA -71.6750 73.9200 -0.2851 -12.2320 24.7680 -0.2182 4.8696 24.7760 0.0996
TA/TL 73.8820 59.3060 3.2561 10.1610 18.3490 2.0076 -0.5951 18.3570 -0.1349
NI/TR ***6.0505 1.6707 0.0191 ***10.1180 1.6643 0.1435 ***9.9554 1.6614 0.1620
NPAT/TA ***45.2600 17.2240 0.0118 **31.6270 15.3160 0.0371 **34.2920 15.3420 0.0461
INF/TE 4.6969 3.3793 0.0089 ***15.1570 3.3362 0.1287 ***13.8320 3.3201 0.1348
MKT/TE ***24.4090 7.5068 0.0201 ***31.7080 6.9032 0.1170 ***32.6550 6.9170 0.1382
RES/LOAN 0.4723 0.4941 0.0090 -0.0066 0.4537 -0.0006 0.1028 0.4532 0.0101
COM/LOAN ***6.2754 2.0693 0.0086 ***8.9929 1.9611 0.0555 ***9.2221 1.9620 0.0653
BAD/LOAN 26.5330 27.2850 0.0027 -5.1755 25.2810 -0.0024 -0.4558 25.2660 -0.0002
MEM ***2.16E-05 6.10E-06 0.0144 ***1.35E-05 5.15E-06 0.0401 ***1.57E-05 5.18E-06 0.0538
BRA -0.0117 0.0176 -0.0021 0.0121 0.0157 0.0098 0.0099 0.0157 0.0091
With identical input prices 
CONS.   14.6970 17.6710 20.7800 17.6850
CAP/TA   14.1780 24.4480 0.3227 25.4380 24.4670 0.6354
TA/TL   -9.5387 18.0820 -2.4052 -16.4400 18.0930 -4.5495
NI/TR   ***7.7412 1.6236 0.1401 ***7.9720 1.6265 0.1584
NPAT/TA   *26.3030 15.0640 0.0394 **30.7150 15.0880 0.0504
INF/TE   ***9.1991 3.2574 0.0997 ***8.9590 3.2556 0.1066
MKT/TE   ***27.8400 6.7848 0.1311 ***29.3510 6.8017 0.1516
RES/LOAN   -0.0808 0.4475 -0.0088 0.0128 0.4473 0.0015
COM/LOAN   ***6.3867 1.8186 0.0503 ***6.8510 1.8259 0.0592
BAD/LOAN   -13.2670 25.0860 -0.0079 -8.1304 25.0780 -0.0053
MEM   ***1.77E-05 5.09E-06 0.0671 ***1.95E-05 5.11E-06 0.0812
BRA   *-0.0290 0.0152 -0.0299 *-0.0289 0.0152 -0.0327
Notes: Asterisks indicate the level of significance at the * – .10, ** – .05 and *** – .01 level; elasticities calculated at 
the means; log-likelihoods are 157.241, 71.993, 55.971, 62.406 and 53.821 respectively 
Of the variables selected to proxy operational characteristics, the proportion of non-interest 
revenue (NI/TR) net profit after-tax (NPAT/TA), marketing and promotion expense (MKT/TE), and 
commercial loans orientation (COM/LOAN) are significant and conform to the hypothesised sign. 
The sign on the number of members  (MEM) is positive and significant at the .01 level, suggesting 
that credit unions with larger memberships tend to be more technically efficient. A Wald Chi-square 
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statistic [W = 74.492  ∼ χ2(4)] confirms the joint significance of CAP/TA, TA/TL, NI/TR and 
NPAT/TA on technical efficiency at the one percent level. An identical test for the characteristics of 
the loan portfolio (that is, RES/LOAN, COM/LOAN and BAD/LOAN) also rejects the null 
hypothesis of joint insignificance, though at the .05 level [W = 11.008  ∼ χ2(3)]. These results 
provide mixed results when compared to Fried’s et al. (1993, p. 262) conclusions concerning U.S. 
credit unions: “efficiency is generally higher for credit unions with a large number of members with 
large assets, with a high delinquency ratio, a high ratio of investments to loans, a low ratio of real 
estate loans to total loans, and no branches”.  
An examination of the elasticities of the coefficients suggests that marketing expenditure 
(MKT/TE) and the number of members (MEM) are relatively more significant at the margin in 
determining technical efficiency. In terms of organisational structure, the number of branches 
(BRA) does not appear to significantly influence credit union technical efficiency. These results 
contrast to those found by Fried et al. (1993) in a study of US credit unions, and Drake and 
Weyman-Jones (1992) of UK building societies, where excessive branching behaviour implied a 
lower level of technical efficiency. Overall, 71.4 percent of the credit unions can be predicted as 
being technically inefficient (that is, with efficiency scores less than one) on the basis of the set of 
explanatory variables. 
Very similar results are obtained for the regression where allocative efficiency is regressed upon 
the set of financial institution characteristics. Tests of the null hypothesis that all the slope 
coefficients are jointly zero is rejected at the .01 level using a Wald chi-square statistic. The main 
difference between the results from the regression using technical efficiency is that the coefficient 
for the share of expenditures made on information technology (INF/TE) is positive and significant 
at the .01 level. This would suggest that relatively larger expenditures on information technology 
are associated with relatively higher levels of allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency in the 
utilisation of resources given their respective factor prices is also higher for credit unions with a 
high level of non-interest income (NI/TR) and commercial loans (COM/LOAN). The marginal effect 
of these variables on allocative efficiency is highest for non-interest income, followed by 
information technology, and finally marketing expenses. The predictive power of the regression 
including allocative efficiency is also higher with 97 percent of credit unions able to be predicted as 
inefficient on the basis of the set of explanatory variables.  
Finally, the estimated coefficients of the tobit regression where cost (or productive) efficiency is 
specified as the dependent variable are also detailed in Table 3. The non-interest income (NI/TR) 
variable yields a positive coefficient, consistent with the interpretation that the adoption of a user-
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pay basis to accounts improves overall cost efficiency, and the level of information technology 
(INF/TE) and marketing expenditures (MKT/TE) are also associated with efficiency gains. A test of 
the null hypothesis of the joint insignificance of the explanatory variables is rejected at the .01 
level, and we may conclude that the same explanatory variables exert a significant influence on the 
level of cost efficiency.  
The final two regressions in Table 3 also specify DEA measures of allocative and cost efficiency 
as the dependent variable. The difference in these regressions is that the underlying DEA model 
assumes that credit unions face identical input prices. However, despite this change in the 
dependent variable, the results are generally consistent with the previous regressions where 
different input prices were assumed. Levels of significance do vary, though not to the extent of 
changing the list of significant and insignificant coefficients, as does the level of explanatory power 
in the regressions. This would suggest, at least in this case, that the competing assumptions of credit 
unions purchasing inputs in competitive markets (and therefore facing identical prices) and credit 
unions paying different prices (as derived from financial statement information) has no significant 
influence on measures of allocative (and hence, cost) efficiency. 
6. Summary and conclusions 
A number of points emerge from the present study. The first part of the paper used a 
nonparametric methodology to measure the cost efficiency of Australian credit unions. The cost 
frontier measures indicate that in 1997 a typical Australian credit union’s costs were thirty percent 
above what could be considered necessary based on observable best-practice. The main source of 
this cost inefficiency would appear to be allocative inefficiency, rather than technical inefficiency; 
that is, the inability of the firm to use inputs in optimal proportions, given the respective prices, 
rather than the inability of the firm to minimise inputs for a given level of output.  
In addition, the efficiency measures are generally invariant to two alternative specifications of 
input prices. In the first specification, input prices are calculated using credit union-specific 
financial statement information and therefore differ across the sample. In the second specification, 
input prices are drawn from an external source of data and assumed to be identical for the entire 
sample. These results counter a criticism that studies of this type may provide biased measures of 
efficiency since they frequently ignore the competitive realities of input markets in labour, physical 
capital and loanable funds. The second part of this paper relates these inefficiency measures to 
several correlates. All other things being equal, a profitable credit union with a high proportion of 
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revenues derived from non-interest income, relatively high expenditures on information technology 
and marketing, a small branch network, and a large number of members will be more cost efficient.  
There are at least three ways in which this research may be extended. First, the approach used in 
this study could be expanded to include additional influences on credit union efficiency. These may 
include variables related to regulatory and administrative frameworks, the degree of competition 
amongst credit unions and other deposit-taking institutions, and additional detail relating to the 
quantity and quality of services offered. Second, in order to more fully examine the changing 
patterns of efficiency improvements, technological change and productivity gain since deregulation 
it may be useful to obtain estimators of credit union efficiency using pooled time-series, cross-
sectional data. This would not only provide consistent estimators of efficiency over time, but would 
also indicate improvements in efficiency due to deregulation and so on. One approach could be the 
Malmquist index approach used by Berg, Førsund and Jansen (1992) to analyse the effects of 
deregulation in Norwegian financial services, and Fukuyama (1995) in Japanese commercial 
banking. Finally, similar techniques to the present study could be extended to examine the question 
of merger in Australian credit unions. Given that mergers largely account for the twenty-three 
percent decline in the number of credit unions over the period 1992 to 1997, a natural question 
arises as to the role of cost inefficiency in promoting merger activity and the cost efficiency 
consequences of these same mergers. 
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